

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Monday June 27, 1977 CG NIDC 77-148C

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, 27 June 1977

[REDACTED] The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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EUROCOMMUNISM: Quarrels with Moscow

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EUROCOMMUNISM: Quarrels with Moscow

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The stinging attack on Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo that appeared in the Soviet press on Thursday will seriously strain Soviet relations with the Spanish party and is certain to have a serious impact on Moscow's relations with the large French and Italian Communist parties. Moscow undoubtedly hopes to drive a wedge between the Spanish party and its Eurocommunist allies.

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The attack has no parallel in Moscow's past quarrels with the Spanish or other independent-minded Western parties. It falls just short of formally reading the Spanish leader out of the Communist movement and is comparable to Soviet attacks on the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.

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The attack, which took the form of an unsigned editorial article in the journal *New Times*, charged Carrillo with "crude anti-Sovietism" and tacit collaboration with "imperialism." The specific provocation for the attack was the views on Eurocommunism and the defects of the Soviet system that Carrillo expressed in a book, *Eurocommunism and the State*, published in April. The authors of the attack charged that Carrillo's views were designed to "counterpose" the communists of East and West, to "discredit" Soviet-style communism, and to perpetuate the "division of Europe" by strengthening the "aggressive NATO bloc." Finally, the editorial warned that Carrillo's views, if put into practice, will lead to a split in the Communist movement.

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The only notable sign of restraint is the fact that the attack appeared in a Foreign Ministry publication, rather than in one of the more authoritative journals of the Soviet party. The article's length and the fact that it was unsigned indicate, however, that it has the imprimatur of higher authority.

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The article clearly is intended for a wider audience than the members of the Spanish party. Communists in Italy and France, who along with the Spanish Communists form the core of the Eurocommunist movement, are intended targets. These parties are united by their formal adherence to the principles of Western democracy. Their efforts to make this position credible by

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criticizing the dictatorial features of the Soviet system have aroused Moscow's resentment and contributed to its difficulties with political dissidents at home and in Eastern Europe.

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[redacted] Moscow's decision to bring the quarrel into the open at this time may be because it is frustrated by the failure of the lobbying efforts. Carrillo was no doubt chosen as the target of the attack because he has been the most outspoken of the Western Communist leaders in his criticism of Moscow and because his party is the smallest and least significant of the big three of Eurocommunism.

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[redacted] The Soviets doubtless hope the French and Italian Communists will draw back before a schism with Moscow develops. If they do, the Soviets will regard an aggravation of their quarrel with the Spanish party as a small price to pay. If they do not retreat, the Soviets will be faced with a difficult choice between ignominious silence and a possibly irreversible split with the principal West European Communist parties.

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[redacted] The early signs are that the French and Italian parties will not retreat. The French Communists reacted Friday in their newspaper *L'Humanite*, describing the *New Times* editorial as "ill-considered" and "badly timed." The Italian Communist newspaper *L'Unita* that same day said that the Soviet attack contained "mistakes and ambiguities."

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[redacted] The Spanish party's Central Committee responded over the weekend with a communique strongly supporting Carrillo and the concept of Eurocommunism. It called the Soviet criticism an attack on "all Communist parties which want a democratic way to socialism," thereby seeking to broaden the issue to include the Italian and French parties. If the Soviet attack was intended to split the Spanish party, it failed; the communique was reportedly endorsed with only one abstention among the approximately 180 members of the Central Committee. [redacted]

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NORTH KOREA - US: Relations

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[Redacted] North Korea is increasing its criticism of US military support for South Korea. Pegged to the 27th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, the North's commentary on June 24 hit out at recent reports of increased US military aid to the South Korean armed forces and at US participation in joint military exercises in the South.

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[Redacted] North Korea does not portray the US activities as threatening its security nor does it mention President Carter or the US plan to withdraw ground forces. The North is nevertheless signaling its displeasure with US efforts to reaffirm its security commitment to Seoul.

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[Redacted] Each year at this time, North Korea conducts a month-long drive to enlist political backing for its campaign to force a withdrawal of all US troops from Korea. This year the campaign was introduced by a special worldwide appeal in the name of various North Korean mass organizations. The appeal asserts that "US military authorities" are seeking to occupy the South permanently and to reinforce the Pak government.

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[Redacted] The appeal cites B-52 training flights over the South and joint military exercises involving not only US forces there but also US marines stationed on Okinawa.

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[Redacted] The North Koreans also have released a long Foreign Ministry statement alleging that the US instigated the Korean conflict. Such statements have been issued before but are usually reserved for the anniversaries occurring every five years.

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[Redacted] Since the Carter administration took office, North Korea's treatment of the US has shown notable restraint. President Kim Il-song has publicly expressed satisfaction over the

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"favorable" US attitude toward North Korea and over President Carter's "pledges" to withdraw US forces and press human rights issues.

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[redacted] At the same time, Kim has voiced misgivings as to whether such pledges would be fully implemented. He has noted critically, for example, that a withdrawal over a four- to five-year period would extend beyond President Carter's current term of office, that it would involve only ground troops and not the US air force, and that it would involve consultations with South Korea and Japan. Kim concluded that the North would "wait and see" how US policy develops. There has, in fact, been a virtual moratorium on public discussion of the troop withdrawal issue.

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[redacted] In the past two weeks, however, Pyongyang has directly criticized the actions of so-called "US bellicose elements." The criticism has coincided with some increase in the level of joint US - South Korean military training activities in the South. An appeal issued on Friday reiterated these charges and cited the activities as evidence of the unchanging nature of "US imperialism."

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[redacted] Although North Korea has not yet adopted an official position on the US withdrawal plans, it clearly has no illusions about the general shape of these plans. The regime may be waiting for what it regards as an authoritative statement from the US before issuing a formal reply.

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[redacted] Kim Il-song undoubtedly welcomes any reduction as a step toward the long-standing goal of complete US disengagement. At the same time, Kim cannot be pleased with the prospect of the South Korean armed forces gaining in strength through US efforts to improve their training and equipment. The upsurge in criticism from Pyongyang is in part a sign of Kim's uneasiness on this score. [redacted]

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CHINA: Provincial Leader Removed

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[redacted] Peking has removed a provincial leader who was a staunch supporter of the now-fallen leftists and one of former vice premier Teng Hsiao-ping's most vociferous critics. Sung Pei-chang, a military man who was party boss of Anhwei Province, has been replaced by Wan Li, a close associate of Teng who was dismissed by the leftists from his position as minister of railways last year after Teng had been ousted.

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[redacted] The change in Anhwei's leadership brings to 13 the number of provinces that have undergone shake-ups since the purge of the leftists. Aside from the leftist stronghold of Shanghai, however, the change in Anhwei is one of the most significant. Along with the three Manchurian provinces, all of which have undergone some leadership changes since the purge of the leftists, Anhwei was one of the most outspoken in its harsh criticism last year of Teng Hsiao-ping.

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[redacted] Sung Pei-chang has now been accused in a radiobroadcast of making mistakes during the anti-Teng campaign, and like some of his colleagues in the northeast, he has been attacked for failing to pursue the anti-leftist campaign.

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[redacted] If there is a link between Anhwei and the northeast, it appears to be Politburo member and military man Li Te-sheng, who is the commander of the northeast military region but who used to be Sung's boss in Anhwei. Li seems to have survived the current roundup of leftist supporters, but the removal of several of his subordinates could raise questions about his own staying power.

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[redacted] The somewhat tardy removal of Sung, who seemed last autumn to be an obvious candidate for purge, may have been the result of strong support for him from Li. Sung's replacement by Wan Li puts the province in the hands of a strong supporter of Teng Hsiao-ping, whose rehabilitation is slated for later this year.

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[redacted] Peking clearly wants to straighten out the leadership problems in the provinces before convening a series of meetings to restaff the national party and government apparatus. More provincial changes may be in the offing, and this process, along

with indications in provincial radiobroadcasts that a more thorough implementation of the anti-leftist campaign is needed, could cause some delays in the selection of delegates to the meetings. [redacted]

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